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Abstract
Structural complexity of systems, coupled with their multi-state characteristics, renders their reliability and availability
evaluation difficult. Notwithstanding the emergence of various techniques dedicated to complex multi-state system
analysis, simulation remains the only approach applicable to realistic systems. However, most simulation algorithms
are either system specific or limited to simple systems since they require enumerating all possible system states,
defining the cut-sets associated with each state and monitoring their occurrence. In addition to being extremely
tedious for large complex systems, state enumeration and cut-set definition require a detailed understanding of the
system’s failure mechanism. In this paper, a simple and generally applicable simulation approach enhanced for multi-
state systems of any topology is presented. Here, each component is defined as a Semi-Markov stochastic process
and via discrete-event simulation, the operation of the system is mimicked. The principles of flow conservation are
invoked to determine flow across the system for every performance level change of its components using the interior-
point algorithm. This eliminates the need for cut-set definition and overcomes the limitations of existing techniques.
The methodology can also be exploited to account for effects of transmission efficiency and loading restrictions of
components on system reliability and performance. The principles and algorithms developed are applied to two
numerical examples to demonstrate their applicability.
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1. Introduction
A system is deemed structurally complex if it’s a non-
series, non-parallel or non-series-parallel interconnec-
tion of components and subsystems. Components are
a system’s smallest building block and therefore deter-
mine its output levels, states and behaviour. In realistic
systems, these components may exist in one of several
possible states/output levels [1] dictated by their fail-
ure characteristics, operating conditions, age or some
stochastic event outside the system boundary. The re-
sult is a system characterised by multiple states, with
the number of states moderated by diversity in output
level of components and system structure [2, 3]. Un-
like binary-state systems which can either be perfectly
working or completely failed, multi-state systems can
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: H.George-Williams@liv.ac.uk (Hindolo
George-Williams), epatelli@liverpool.ac.uk (Edoardo Patelli)
exist in intermediate states. The number of intermediate
states may or may not be finite depending on the perfor-
mance measure under consideration and the type of sys-
tem being studied [3]. For instance, the power generated
by a hydroelectric power plant may take any value be-
tween zero and its maximum achievable level depending
on the height of water in the dam, the performance level
of its components and demand on the grid. Other exam-
ples of multi-state systems are communication systems;
where data processing speed [4, 5] may be the perfor-
mance measure, cooling systems; where coolant flow
rate or cooling capacity [6] may be the performance
measure and production systems; where production rate
is the performance measure. These systems may either
be standalone or form an indispensable integral part of
some critical system like safety critical and industrial
control systems. Therefore, it is important to be able to
predict their susceptibility to failure and quantify the en-
suing consequences on their performance for effective
planning of preventive and corrective measures. This
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process is referred to as reliability prediction. Reliabil-
ity prediction has cruised through tremendous develop-
ments; moving from traditional methods that consider
the failure of a system as being a consequence of fail-
ure of its components only to methods that treat failure
of a system from a wider perspective including external
factors [7]. Today, reliability prediction transcends just
defining a set of standards for predicting the failure rate
of components to system-level and safety of complex
engineering systems [8].
1.1. Current System Reliability Evaluation Techniques
In system reliability and performance evaluation,
the analyst has numerous techniques at their disposal.
Sometimes one technique cannot quite yield the re-
quired outcome and a collection of techniques is re-
quired instead. The technique employed is determined
by the system being analysed, reliability indices of in-
terest, available computing resources and the degree of
precision demanded. These techniques according to
[9, 10] (cited in [2]), can be classed as either heuris-
tic, analytical or simulation based. They can also be
classified on the basis of applicability in which case
they can either be static or dynamic [2]. Unlike static
techniques, dynamic techniques do not only model the
system based on functional and structural relationships
between its components but also support dynamic rela-
tionships like inter component dependencies.
Reliability Block Diagrams[11, 12] and Fault Trees
[11, 13] are the most common traditional reliability
analysis techniques and have been used extensively in
reliability evaluation of binary-state systems. Relia-
bility Block Diagrams are a graphical expression of
functional relationships between system components in
terms of combination of functioning components re-
quired for system success. Fault Trees express this
functional relationship via boolean logic gates and de-
pict the combination of component failure that culmi-
nates into system failure. These two techniques prove
particularly useful for moderately sized systems with
series-parallel configurations but become cumbersome
with large complex systems and often require additional
techniques [14] to decompose the system. Overcom-
ing this difficulty necessitated the development of Re-
liability Graphs. Reliability Graphs [15, 16] represent
the system as a network of nodes connected by edges
and they are very much efficient in modelling struc-
tural complexities; system failure is defined as the non-
existence of path between source and sink nodes [2].
These three techniques utilise the assumption of com-
ponents being statistically independent rendering them
incapacitated for systems with dynamic properties like
restrictive repairs and systems with components ex-
hibiting dependent and dynamic relationships. How-
ever, techniques including but not limited to Dynamic
Reliability Block Diagrams [2], Dynamic Fault Trees
[17], Condition-based Fault Trees [18], Dynamic Flow
Graphs [19, 20], Petri Nets [21] and other combinato-
rial techniques [22] have been developed to model these
dynamic relationships. They have found application
in a wide range of reliability engineering problems in-
cluding repairable systems with restrictive maintenance
policies [21, 22].
Though the earliest forms of these techniques were
applicable only to binary-state systems, numerous in-
stances of their recent extension to multi-state systems
are present in literature. Lisnianski [23] employed an
extended block diagram method to apply classical block
diagram principles to a repairable system. Binary Deci-
sion Diagrams (BDD) [24, 25] which underlying princi-
ples are built upon Boolean algebra have also been ap-
plied with success to multi-state system reliability eval-
uation. They proceed via a state enumeration procedure
in which each system state is represented by a multi-
state fault tree. Unfortunately, state enumeration is only
feasible for moderately sized and simple systems, for
complex systems it’s expensive and error prone if done
by hand. Consequently, their applicability is limited to
moderately sized simple systems. In recent years, re-
liability graphs have also attracted significant attention
which interest has given birth to algorithms optimized
for multi-state system reliability evaluation. Though,
Yeh on two separate occasions([26] and [27]) developed
algorithms that do not require prior knowledge of all
minimal paths or cuts of the system, most graph based
algorithms do [28–31]. As such, exploiting them re-
quires first deriving the desired path or cut sets using
other well known algorithms which in itself is an NP-
hard problem [26, 27]. Compounding their challenges
(including Yeh’s algorithms in [26] and [27]) is the fact
that they are based on the assumption that capacities
of system components take only non-negative integer
values. However, in many systems, components and
system capacities are positive but not necessarily inte-
ger valued. In addition to their individual short falls,
the extended block diagram technique, BDD and graph
based algorithms share two common limitations. They
define system reliability with respect to maximum flow
through the system. Therefore they are limited to sys-
tems with single output nodes or systems (like signal
transmission networks [32]) with multiple output nodes
in which only the presence of flow at these nodes is
desired but the relative magnitude is irrelevant. They
stop short at solving multi-output systems with com-
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peting demand at the output nodes. The second limi-
tation arises from the assumption that there are no flow
losses in the system, implying inapplicability to certain
practical engineering systems encountered in real life in
which flow under some condition (e.g. component fail-
ure) escapes across the component/system boundary.
Various researchers [1, 4–6, 33, 34] have made in-
valuable contributions to multi-state system reliability
analysis, developing techniques applicable to a wide
range of systems. These techniques are based mainly on
either the structure function approach, stochastic pro-
cess, simulation or the Universal Generating Function
approach [3, 35, 36]. The most popular stochastic pro-
cess employed in reliability analysis is Markov Chain
which involves enumerating all possible states of the
system and evaluating the associated state probabilities
[36, 37]. This technique is only easily applicable to ex-
ponential transitions or distributions with simple cumu-
lative distribution functions, requires complicated math-
ematics and becomes complex for large systems. The
number of states in the model ranges from m + 1 for
binary-state series systems to 2m for binary-state par-
allel systems, where m is the number of components
making up the system. For large multi-state systems,
the number of states increases dramatically thereby ren-
dering the model difficult to construct and expensive
to compute. The Universal Generating Function(UGF)
technique was introduced to address the large number of
states problem the Markov Process technique is plagued
with. It allows the algebraic derivation of system per-
formance from the performance distribution of its com-
ponents [3, 38]. However, both techniques are limited
in the number of reliability and performance indices
they can quantify. In [39], Lisnianski introduced the
Lz-Transform and inverse Lz-Transform concepts to en-
hance the derivation of instantaneous reliability mea-
sures like system reliability R(t), instantaneous avail-
ability A(t) and instantaneous system output X(t) with
the UGF technique [6, 38]. The UGF is a powerful
tool, its applicability has been extended even to systems
with dependent components as illustrated by Levitin
[35, 40]. However, like the other multi-state system re-
liability evaluation techniques previously discussed, the
UGF is maximum flow based and assumes flow conser-
vation across system components. Also, though straight
forward for systems with simple series/parallel archi-
tecture, it requires substantial effort for systems with a
non-series/parallel structure including those composed
of many subsystems. These considerations have hin-
dered its application to certain multi-state system relia-
bility problems.
Simulation techniques [41–43] are the most suitable
for multi-state system reliability and performance eval-
uation since they mimic the actual operation of the sys-
tem. Their advantages over other techniques are derived
from the fact that they can support any transition distri-
bution type, enhance the study of effects of external un-
certainties on system performance and reliability [43]
and are easily integrated with other reliability analysis
techniques [44, 45]. Though computationally expensive
for large systems and small failure probabilities, tech-
niques that reduce the computation time and effort now
exist, thanks to recent advances in computing. Variance
reduction techniques and parallel computing can reduce
the computation time and effort by substantial amounts
when adopted. Also in extensive use are Subset Simu-
lation [46] and Line Sampling [47, 48], both of which
improve the efficiency of simulations. Instances of sim-
ulation algorithms relying on prior knowledge of path
or cut-sets are found in [43, 49, 50]. Yeh et al. [51]
however developed a simulation approach that doesn’t
require prior knowledge of system path/cut sets but ap-
plicable only to binary-state systems.
Analytical techniques exhibit superior computational
efficiency over their simulation counterparts. However,
as already expressed, they suffer a setback when so-
licited for realistic systems. Often, the reliability an-
alyst is not only interested in steady-state or instanta-
neous reliability measures but also the underlying prob-
ability distributions governing the behaviour of the sys-
tem as well as effects of external uncertainties (e.g., re-
strictive maintenance schemes, human, environmental
and other stochastic external factors) on the values as-
sumed by these measures. When faced with such sce-
narios, simulation becomes the most feasible alterna-
tive. In summary, both analytical and simulation proce-
dures are restricted by their various unique limitations.
Therefore, the development of a single technique that
addresses these is vital.
1.2. Proposed Approach
The proposed approach is based on the fact that if the
properties of components building a system are known,
then its output performance can be deduced directly
from its network model. Implementing this necessitates
modelling each component as a multi-state object char-
acterised by a state space diagram depicting its possible
states with their interactions and a set defining the prop-
erties associated with each state. The operation of the
system is simulated by generating component states and
transition times from their state-space representation.
The generated transitions are effected and the system
output performance evaluated at each transition. Tran-
sition and output histories of components as well as the
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system are captured and saved as the simulation pro-
gresses. These enhance the evaluation of any reliabil-
ity/performance index both at the system and compo-
nent levels. To replicate the actual operating procedure
of systems, a special component shut down and restart
operation is instituted. In this operation, the availability
of each system component is tested at every transition
against its predefined reference minimum input/output
load level. With this, the latent interdependence of sys-
tem components is accounted for.
A common feature exhibited by components of many
realistic systems is transmission inefficiency; a term as-
cribed to the phenomenon in which an intermediate
component transmits only a fraction of flow received
from its preceding component. The component in other
words acts as a partial sink and dissipates part of the
flow such that the flow transmitted to the next compo-
nent is less than that received. Under this condition,
flow is no longer conserved and techniques built around
the flow conservation principle become obsolete. To
illustrate the effect of this phenomenon on system re-
liability, consider a 50MW power generator supplying
a 45MW load through a 75MW transformer. If there
are no power losses in the transformer, 45MW will be
transmitted to the load. However, if the capacity of
the transformer remains unchanged but its efficiency re-
duces to 75%, it takes 50MW from the generator (as-
suming capacity constraint is imposed) but transmits
only 37.5MW to the load. In both cases, the apparent
difference between capacity and demand remains con-
stant but the power drawn from the generator increases
and the effective power supplied to the load reduces.
Other examples are a power transmission line prone to
losses and an oil pipeline in which a mode of failure
could be a hole in a pipe or gasket failure at some flange.
The transmission inefficiency of system components
may exert undesirable effects on system performance
and reliability, it’s therefore worthwhile considering this
property in the reliability evaluation process. In the sce-
nario just discussed, the generator would need to be
rated at least 60MW to match demand. Therefore, if the
system is not equipped with adequate controls such that
the capacity constraint is always satisfied, the genera-
tor may fail due to overloading even though demand re-
mains well below its rated capacity. Considering this in
the proposed methodology, each component state is de-
fined by an associated output performance level and sink
index which respectively state the maximum flow ac-
cepted or generated and the proportion dissipated when
the component resides in that state.
Convenient representation of system architecture and
evaluating system output from changes in states of com-
ponents are the two prime difficulties encountered in
simulation of complex multi-state systems. In the pro-
posed approach, these are overcome by applying the
concept of adjacency matrices from network theory to
define the structure of the system. Adjacency matrices
are a square array of 1’s and 0’s depicting the connec-
tivity of a network and can easily represent any system
architecture. They can be manipulated to obtain system
flow equations which are solved to determine the mag-
nitude of flow through every node of the system. The
efficiency of this lies in the fact that it eliminates the
need for definition of cut sets or enumeration of system
states; both of which normally become laborious with
complex systems. Complex network theory is a widely
used concept and finds application in many engineering
and real life problems. It’s particularly useful in repre-
senting and analysing complexities in system structure.
As a result many researchers have applied its princi-
ples to a variety of problems, yielding excellent results.
For instance, Dwivedi et al.[52] used it in vulnerabil-
ity analysis of a power system, Todinov[53] established
his optimization of repairable flow networks entirely on
it and Chen et al. [54] used it to perform a reliabil-
ity/availability analysis on Manhattan street networks.
1.2.1. Advantages Over Existing Techniques
The following enumerates the key contribution of
the proposed technique to multi-state system reliability
evaluation.
1. Being simulation based, it inherits all the advan-
tages of simulation approaches to system reliabil-
ity and performance evaluation. With respect to
other simulation algorithms, it can implement any
system structure with relative ease since it doesn’t
require knowledge of minimal path or cut sets prior
to system analysis.
2. It is not maximum flow based. Instead, it calculates
the actual flow across every node of the system.
This consequently makes possible the following;
a). analysis of systems with multiple source and
sink nodes with competing demand which can
be static or instantaneous
b). analysis of systems prone to losses at nodes
and across edges
c). easy restart and shut-down of components so
as to replicate the actual operation of systems
where necessary.
3. Node capacities and system demand can take on
any positive value. They do not necessarily have to
be integer valued as required by graph based algo-
rithms.
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1.3. Outline of Paper
The remainder of this paper is organised into four sec-
tions. Section 2 describes the modelling of system com-
ponents followed in Section 3 by a description of how
the system is modelled. The latter also contains details
of the simulation procedure and its associated limita-
tions. Implementation of the numerical case studies to
show the applicability of the approach and an analysis
of its computational requirements are contained in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 constitutes the conclusion.
2. Component Modelling
Multi-state components and systems are discrete in
space but continuous in time. That is, they exist in only
one state at any given instance but reside continuously in
that state until a transition occurs. The transition instan-
taneously takes them to another state where they also re-
side continuously until the next transition [11]. In com-
ponents, these transitions are defined by time dependent
probability distributions or some stochastic event out-
side the component boundary which underlying proba-
bility distribution may or may not be known.
Interactions between the states of an n state compo-
nent and their corresponding transition probability den-
sity functions can be represented by an n order square
Transition Matrix, T. Sometimes certain transitions
may be controlled by a direct effect of events outside the
component boundary. A renown example of this would
be a system composed of a series connection of multiple
repairable components.
Figure 1: State space diagram of an arbitrary multi-state component
On failure of a component, the other operating com-
ponents would have to be shut down and restarted only
after the failed component is restored. In such a sys-
tem, the shut down and restart of operating components
is triggered by the failure and repair of another compo-
nent. However, the occurrence of these failure and re-
pair events is marked by uncertainty, making it impos-
sible to assign a probability distribution to component
transitions triggered by them. Also, the triggered transi-
tions may not exhibit the Markovian property, in that the
component’s next state can also depend on its previous
state(s). These transitions will be referred to as forced
transitions since they are induced by events outside the
component boundary and normal transition otherwise.
If the transition from state x to y is represented by
the pair (x, y) and determined by its probability density
function fxy(t), then each element at position (x, y) of
T is equal to fxy(t). Assuming all possible transitions
from state x have the same priority, the next state, y de-
pends only on which transition occurs first. Hence, T
completely defines the stochastic behaviour of the com-
ponent as outlined in Equation 1.
T = { fxy(t)}n×n | x , y (x, y) ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
T(x, y) =

∞, If (x,y) is a forced transition
0, If no transition between x & y
fxy(t), Otherwise
(1)
Figure 1 shows the state space diagram of an arbitrary
five-state component, where the label beside each arc
represents the probability density function of the transi-
tion depicted.
The performance level; cx of a binary-state compo-
nent in state x is such that cx ∈ {0, cmax} where cx = cmax
if the component is working and 0 otherwise. For multi-
state components, the performance level is defined by
the set 0 ≤ cx ≤ cmax, where cmax is its maximum perfor-
mance level. Each state is characterised by a maximum
value of load; cx the component can supply or transmit
and is referred to as its capacity in that state. There-
fore, the performance of a component is defined by the
vector, C of state capacities as follows,
C = {cx}n | 0 ≤ cx ≤ cmax, n ≥ 2 (2)
The sink index; εx is introduced to define the amount of
flow dissipated in the component in state x as a fraction
of the total flow received. Applicable only to interme-
diate components, this property of the component takes
a value between 0 and 1. A value of 0 meaning outflow
is equal to inflow and a value of 1 corresponding to the
case when outflow is zero but inflow greater than zero.
At a value of 1, the component effectively becomes a
sink, which explains the choice of name for this prop-
erty. The sink index of a component is expressed by the
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vector S,
S = {εx}n | 0 ≤ εx ≤ 1 (3)
Also, a component may be subjected to loading restric-
tions in a bid to preserve its reliability and/or ensure its
safe operation. This often requires the load to exceed a
threshold value but lie within the maximum load rating
of the component. Outside this range, the component
is either shut down or considered failed. The maximum
load rating corresponds to the maximum value of C but
the threshold load rating may be greater than its mini-
mum value since the component may be prone to com-
plete failures or maintenance states characterised by a
cx value of 0. Therefore, the minimum load rating of
the component is defined by Λ | 0 ≤ Λ ≤ cmax.
Each parameter discussed uniquely identifies a com-
ponent, determines its behaviour and subsequently its
effect on system performance and reliability. Therefore,
a component is represented by the quintuple; E, defined
as,
E = (T,C,S,Λ, x0) (4)
Where x0 is the initial state of the component.
2.1. Application to Repairable Multi-state Components
and Systems
A simple illustration will be used to describe the
modelling of a multi-state component with one or more
repairable partial failure modes. Consider a 40MVA
generator subjected to a 20% minimum load restriction
and assume it generally exists in three possible states
defined as follows;
• State 1, depicting operation at its nominal output
level
• State 2, depicting operation below its nominal
level, say 25MVA as a consequence of its partial
failure
• State 3, depicting its total failure.
Presented in Figure 2 is a representation of the interac-
tions between the states of the generator. State 2 is the
state of interest in this illustration and the objective is to
explore the possible events embedded in the restoration
process from partial failure (i.e, transition (2, 1)).
The figure is based on the assumption that the genera-
tor remains in operation whilst undergoing repairs from
state 2 (on-line repairs). However, this is not the case
for components of many real world engineering sys-
tems. Most components would need to be taken out
of operation before repair actions can be completed.
This event may also trigger the unavailability of other
components of the system as explained in the preced-
ing section. Therefore, the assumption may result in
over/under estimation of certain reliability indices when
wrongly applied.
Now, consider the assumption that the generator is in
series with an external breaker which can undergo fail-
ure and repair and a further assumption that the former
cannot be repaired on-line. To account for the period
when it is out of operation as a result of failure of the
breaker, a new state; 5 is introduced as shown in Figure
3. The restoration of the generator from state 2 to 1 may
follow one of two possible operational principles;
• Case 1: Repair is initiated as soon as it enters state
2. This technically means the generator does not
exist in states 2 and 3
• Case 2: Repair is delayed until the generator is not
in operation i.e., either totally failed or when shut
down from partial failure.
Figure 2: State space diagram of 40MVA generator
(a) Immediate repair (b) Repair only after
shut down
Figure 3: Alternative state representation of generator
These necessitate the introduction of a fifth state; 4 to
account for the period when it is undergoing repairs
from state 2 to 1. The new state-space representations of
the generator are presented in Figure 3 showing normal
and forced transitions. Forced transitions would have to
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be manually effected during the simulation as they do
not always only depend on the current state of the com-
ponent. For instance, the generator goes to state 4 from
state 5 if its previous state is state 2 else it goes to state
1 as shown in Figure 3b. Using case 2 as example, the
parameters of the generator would be as given below,
T =

0 f12(t) 0 0 ∞
0 0 f23(t) 0 ∞
f31(t) f32(t) 0 0 0
f41(t) 0 0 0 0
∞ 0 0 ∞ 0

C =
(
40 25 0 0 0
)
Λ = 8
The sink index for each state is zero since the genera-
tor is a source. As a rule-of-thumb, sink-index is not
required for sources and sinks of a system as evident in
the system flow equations derived in Section 3.2.1.
The modelling technique described can be extended
to components with multiple partial failure modes. This
is achieved by introducing two states (one each for shut
down and repair ) for each partial failure state as shown
in Figure 3.
2.2. Determining Component State Transition Parame-
ters
The key to reliability evaluation of systems composed
of multi-state components is being able to correctly de-
termine the next state of a component and when the tran-
sition takes place. The proposed algorithm for sampling
the next transition parameters (next state and transition
time) of a multi-state component is based on the as-
sumption that the next state of the component depends
on only its current state. Starting with the component
in state x at time tc, the algorithm is summarised as fol-
lows;
Step 1. Locate all non-zero elements in row x of T, sav-
ing their associated column number.
Step 2. Sample each element in step 1 and save the
sampled value. Deterministic elements do not
need to be sampled. For instance, if T(x, y) =
10, then 10 becomes the sampled time for tran-
sition (x, y).
Step 3. Find the minimum of the transition delay times
obtained in step 2 and define a set containing
the transitions with delay time equal to this min-
imum value.
Step 4. If the set defined in step 3 has only one ele-
ment, then the next state; y is the column in T
corresponding to the transition defined by the
element. Otherwise, an element is randomly
selected according to a uniform discrete distri-
bution between 1 and the maximum number of
elements in the set. The next state is deduced
from the column to which this element belongs.
Step 5. The next transition time of the component is the
sum of the minimum time obtained in step 3 and
the current simulation time.
Algorithm 1 Sampling procedure for transition param-
eters of a multi-state component
Require: x and tc are respectively the current state of
the component and current simulation time
function Sample(x,T,tc)
Y ← f ind(T(x, :) > 0) . possible transitions from
state x
f ← T(x,Y) . Transition Distributions
k ←Number of elements in f
for n←1 to k do. Loop over number of elements
Delay(n)←Sample from f (n)
end for
S ampledTime← min(Delay) . get least delay
p← f ind(Delay← S ampledTime) . get
transitions with Delay times equal to S ampledTime
if length of p > 1 then . Check length of p
u← rand() . Generate a uniform random
number between 0 and 1
index← du ∗ numel(p)e . Product
of u and the length of p approximated to the smallest
following integer
else
index← p
end if
y← Y(index) . get next component state
NextTransitionT ime← S ampledTime + tc
return (y, NextTransitionT ime)
end function
These steps are summarised as a pseudo-code by Al-
gorithm 1. Its major advantage is that it ensures an
unbiased determination of the transition parameters of
components including those exhibiting both determinis-
tic and probabilistic state transitions. It’s clear the al-
gorithm will never select a forced transition over one
exhibiting markovian properties. As a rule-of-thumb, it
is not applied when the component resides in states from
which only forced transitions are possible (e.g, state 5 in
Figure 3). The simulation algorithm should therefore be
equipped with special routines to force these transitions.
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3. System Modelling
In complex network theory, system topology is de-
fined by a graph, which is a set of nodes connected by
edges or links across which some controlled informa-
tion is transmitted. This controlled information may be
the current flowing in a circuit, energy generated from a
power plant, liquid pumped from a reservoir, traffic flow
rate in a street network or any quantifiable quantity of
interest. In a graph, there is a set, s of nodes generating
the controlled information and another set, t consuming
or utilising the generated information. Nodes belonging
to s are source nodes and nodes belonging to t; sink or
target nodes. Between these two are nodes helping in
transmission of the controlled information and facilitate
communication between source and sink nodes. These
are called intermediate nodes. The success and qual-
ity of the communication process is influenced by the
performance of source and intermediate nodes. If in-
formation can flow in only one direction through every
edge, then the graph is said to be directed otherwise it’s
undirected or bidirectional.
3.1. The System as a Directed Graph
As already established in section 1, Engineering sys-
tems are designed to accomplish a specific often quan-
tifiable process. Process flow may be possible in any
direction depending on the connectivity of the system
and properties of its components but at any given time,
its direction is known and fixed [52]. Systems are com-
posed of a collection of components performing differ-
ent but specific roles and together determine the success
of the process. Some of these components are respon-
sible for initiating the process whilst some only serve
as links to ensure progression of the process. There’s
also another actor normally external to the system that
utilises the process and drives it through the system. The
set of components initiating the process are analogous
to sources in a graph, so are the components serving as
links analogous to intermediate nodes and the external
factor driving the process analogous to sinks. Hence,
the topology of the system can be conveniently and ac-
curately represented by a directed graph.
Since the aim in system reliability evaluation is to
investigate the effects of component failure on system
performance and life span, the structure of the system
can be represented by a directed graph with components
and output points being considered nodes connected by
perfectly reliable edges i.e., edges do not fail. When
modelling systems with unreliable links e.g, power dis-
tribution networks, then each unreliable link should be
treated as a component and represented as a node. If G
is a directed graph, then the structure of the system is
defined by G as,
G = (V,A) (5)
where V is the set of nodes and A, the adjacency ma-
trix. The adjacency matrix is an M order square matrix
defining the connectivity of nodes, where M is the total
number of nodes of the system . A connection between
node i and j in the system is represented in the adjacency
matrix by 1 at the intersection of row i and column j if
process flow is from node i to j (i → j), 1 at the inter-
section of row j and column i if flow is from node j to i
(i ← j) and 0 if a connection does not exist. The node
pair, (i, j) representing a connection and flow from node
i to j is known as an edge, ei j of the system. A row of
the adjacency matrix depicts the source node of an edge
and a column; the incident/target node of the edge. The
edges of the system are defined by a k by 2 matrix; e,
where k the total number of edges is equal to the sum of
the elements of the adjacency matrix.
A = {ai j}M×M | ai j =
1 If flow is i→ j0 Otherwise (6)
e = {i, j}k×2 | k =
M∑
j=1
M∑
i=1
ai j ∀(i, j) ∈ V (7)
For some systems, the links may be reliable but inef-
ficient which can have negative effects on system relia-
bility and performance. Let αi j be the efficiency of edge
ei j such that 0 < αi j ≤ 1. Note that if the efficiency of a
link is zero, then it becomes a sink and should therefore
be treated as a node. If in defining the adjacency ma-
trix, the efficiencies of the links are used, then Equation
6 becomes;
A = {ai j}M×M | ai j =
αi j If flow is i→ j0 Otherwise (8)
and k redefined as the total number of non-zero elements
of A i.e., k =
∑M
j=1
∑M
i=1(ai j > 0). Another property
of links encountered in many real world systems (e.g,
transmission lines in power distribution systems) is their
maximum load rating. Let li j be the maximum allow-
able load for edge ei j such that 0 < li j ≤ ∞. The upper
bound corresponds to the case when no load restrictions
are imposed on the edge. Though unrealistic, this as-
sumption is useful in maximum flow analysis of distri-
bution networks. To account for this third property of a
network, the capacity matrix; L is introduced to define
the maximum capacity of edges. Each non-zero element
of L corresponds to a non-zero entry in A.
L = {li j}M×M (9)
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Therefore, Equation 5 can be adapted to define both
the structure of a system and the properties of its links
as expressed in Equation 10.
G = (V,A,L) (10)
Now that the adjacency and edge matrices have been
discussed and their mathematical relations expressed, a
fourth matrix defining the relationship between edges
and nodes of the system with respect to the direction of
process flow will be introduced. This matrix is known
as the incidence matrix; Γ and is an M by k matrix with
nodes represented by rows and edges by columns. If
the edges are numbered from 1 to k and nodes from 1
to M, then for an edge ei j, the element in the column
corresponding to the edge number (i.e., index of (i, j) in
matrix e) and row i (the local source node), is assigned
the value 1, the element in row j (the incident/local tar-
get node) is assigned the value −ai j and 0 in all other
rows.
Γ = {γpq}M×k | γpq =

1, p = i
−ai j, p = j
0, otherwise
∀(i, j) ∈ e
(11)
The variable q = 1, 2, ..., k (the edge number) is the in-
dex of edge (i, j) or ei j in e and p = 1, 2, ...,M. Given
the adjacency matrix alone of the system, e and Γ can be
derived by applying equations 7 and 11. This procedure
is summarised in Algorithm 2.
3.2. System Representation and Flow Analysis
As discussed in section 3.1, a system can be repre-
sented by a directed graph comprising source, interme-
diate and sink nodes. The source and intermediate nodes
are physical components making up the structure of the
system while sink nodes are output points via which
system output is consumed. All three node types can
be modelled by the methodology proposed in section 2.
However, T is usually unknown for output nodes prior
to analysis can therefore not be defined. Also, S is not
required for output/sink nodes as evidenced in the sys-
tem flow equations derived later in Section 3.2.1. There-
fore, for output nodes, equation 4 could be re-written as,
E = (C,Λ) (12)
Since it’s impossible to determine all output levels
prior to analysis for some systems, specifying C for
sink/output nodes is optional. Alternatively, it could be
defined by specifying only the output levels of interest.
Algorithm 2 Procedure for deriving the edge and in-
cidence matrices of a system
Require: A, the adjacency matrix of the system
function GetMatrix(A)
M ← size(A, 1) . get number of nodes
k ← ∑Mj=1 ∑Mi=1(ai j > 0) . get number of edges
for n←1 to M do
index←columns with non-zero entries
w←number of elements in index
e(end + 1 : end + w, :)← [n∗ {1}w×1 indexT ]
end for
Γ← {0}M×k . predefine the incidence matrix by
an M by k array of zeros
i←vector of elements in column 1 of e
j←vector of elements in column 2 of e
position← jT + {0, 1, ..., k − 1} ∗ M
position1← i + ( j − 1) ∗ M
Γ(position)← −A(position1) . update values
position2← iT + {0, 1, ..., k − 1} ∗ M
Γ(position2)← 1 . update values
return (e,Γ)
end function
If E is the set containing the properties, Ei of each node
of the system, then the system structure and property
can be defined by the set S.
S = (G,E) | E = {Ei}M ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} (13)
3.2.1. Derivation of System Flow Equations
To understand the flow of processes in systems, it’s
worthwhile to think of source nodes as reservoirs and
intermediate nodes as valves in a pipe network. The
total flow through the system depends on the amount
of liquid in the reservoir and the resistance to flow in
the pipe network. These properties are functions of the
capacities of the source and intermediate nodes respec-
tively. As source and intermediate nodes perform their
functions, their capacities change consistent with their
state-space diagrams, leading to a change in resistance
of some flow paths. The result is the existence of paths
with high resistance and some with very low resistance
triggering differential flow redirection. The amount of
flow through a path is directly proportional to the capac-
ity of the smallest node in that path. Hence, more flow
will be redirected through the path of least resistance
(highest capacity) as illustrated in figure 4.
Node 1 is a source, node 5 a sink and nodes 2, 3 & 4
are intermediate nodes. Initially, all intermediate nodes
have the same capacity, resulting in equal path resis-
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tance for both upper and lower paths between source
and sink. Hence, the 1 unit of flow from the source
is split equally between the paths as shown in Figure
4a. In Figure 4b, the capacity of node 4 reduces to 0.2
thereby creating a difference in resistances of the two
paths. Since the maximum capacity of the upper path
is 1, 0.8 units of flow are redirected through it and 0.2
through the lower path. If at this stage, the capacity of
node 3 is also reduced to 0.5 (Figure 4c), the capacity of
the upper path becomes 0.5. Therefore, only 0.5 units of
flow are transmitted along the upper path and 0.2 along
the lower.
1
2 3
4
5
2 3
4
5
c=1
c=1 c=1
c=1
c=1
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
c=1
c=1
c=0.2
c=1
c=1
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.2 0.2
2 3
4
5
c=1
c=1
c=0.2
c=1
c=0.50.5
0.5
0.5
0.2 0.2
a
b c
1 1
Figure 4: Flow visualisation in an arbitrary 5 node system
Flow redirection may appear simple and straight for-
ward for systems as simple as the one shown in Figure 4
but presents itself as an optimization problem for large
systems with complex topology. The optimization nor-
mally consists of multiple parameters and constraints
and has as its goal the calculation of flow along each
edge of the network.
Let Xi j be the magnitude of flow in edge ei j, f+i ; the
set of nodes connected to the inlet of node i, f−i ; the
set of nodes connected to the outlet of node i, c{i}x ; the
current capacity of node i and x; the current state of
node i. The total inflow for source nodes is zero and for
sink nodes, the total outflow is zero which means i ∈ s
if f+i = ∅ and i ∈ t if f−i = ∅. The constraints and
by extension the equations governing the optimization
procedure hinge on the following assumptions;
1. The system is equipped with adequate controls
such that flow does not exceed the capacity of a
node. This is known as the capacity constraint. For
intermediate and sink nodes, it means the total in-
flow should not exceed the node capacity and it’s
expressed mathematically as,∑
j∈f+i
X jiα ji ≤ c{i}x | (i, j) ∈ e, f+i ⊂ V (14)
For source nodes, the statement means the total
outflow should not exceed the node capacity;∑
j∈f−i
Xi j ≤ c{i}x | (i, j) ∈ e, f−i ⊂ V (15)
Equations 14 and 15 can be combined into a single
equation defining the capacity constraint of all the
nodes of the system.
Θ{Xi j}k×1 ≤ {c{i}x }M×1 | (i, j) ∈ e, ∀i ∈ V (16)
The matrix, Θ is related to the incidence matrix, Γ
of the system as follows,
Θ = {θiq}M×k | θiq =

γiq, i ∈ s
−γiq, γiq < 0
0, otherwise
(17)
2. Flow in the system is conserved. That is,
• Total flow generated by sources equals the
sum of flow consumed by sinks and any
losses at intermediate nodes.
• The total inflow at an intermediate node; i |
i ∈ (s ∪ t)′ equals its total outflow plus any
losses at the node.
Expressing the second statement mathematically,
equation 18 is obtained;∑
j∈f−i
Xi j −
∑
j∈f+i
X jiα ji = 0 | (i, j) ∈ e (18)
The flow conservation constraint equation for the
system can be obtained by applying equation 18 to
all intermediate nodes of the system. This equation
is defined as,
Φ{Xi j}k×1 = {0}ð×1 ∀(i, j) ∈ e (19)
where ð is the number of intermediate nodes. If
the incidence matrix, Γ is expressed in terms of its
rows, Γp i.e.,
Γ =

Γ1
Γ2
.
.
.
ΓM−1
ΓM

= {Γp}M | p = 1, 2, ...,M (20)
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then Φ and Γ are related as expressed in equation
21.
Φ =

Φ1
Φ2
.
.
.
Φð−1
Φð

= {Φλ}ð | Φλ = Γp, λ = 1, 2, ...,ð
ð < M, f : λ→ p ∀p ∈ (s ∪ t)′
(21)
In other words, Φ (row designated as Φλ) is a ð
by k sub matrix of Γ containing all the rows in Γ
corresponding to intermediate nodes.
If the transmission efficiency of intermediate nodes
is considered, and given that ε{i}x is the current sink
index of node i, equation 18 is rewritten as,∑
j∈f−i
Xi j − (1 − ε{i}x )
∑
j∈f−i
X jiα ji = 0 | (i, j) ∈ e (22)
and the matrix, Φ in equation 19 redefined as
Φ = {φλq}ð×k | φλq =
(1 − ε{p}x )γpq, γpq < 0γpq, otherwise
λ = 1, 2, ...,ð, ð < M
f : λ→ p ∀p ∈ (s ∪ t)′
(23)
Comparing equations 21 and 23 reveals that the
former is a special case of the latter which is the
case when the value of ε{i}x is set to 0 (i.e., 100%
efficient nodes).
3. If the capacity of a node changes, the flow in the
system is reconfigured to match the prevailing sys-
tem conditions. The flow,Ψ, generated by sources
is such that flow into sinks is maximised. That is,
sources always try to match available demand. For
a system, Ψ is defined as,
Ψ = −
∑
j∈f−i
∑
i∈s
Xi j
= −{ψq}1×k{Xi j}k×1 | ψq =
∑
i∈s
γiq
q = 1, 2, ..., k
(24)
In the optimization problem, the goal is to deter-
mine the minimum value of Ψ that maximises the
flow in the system. Hence, Ψ represents the objec-
tive function of the optimization.
4. The minimum allowable flow through an edge ei j
is 0 but the maximum is defined by the smallest
of the maximum capacities of its nodes i & j and
its capacity; li j. That is, 0 ≤ Xi j ≤ Ωi j, where
Ωi j is the maximum flow through the edge. If lb
represents the vector of lower bounds and ub the
vector of upper bounds of all edges of the network,
then,
lb = {0}k×1, ub = {Ωi j}k×1
Ωi j = min{c{i}max, c{ j}max, li j} ∀(i, j) ∈ e
(25)
Equations 16, 19, 24 and 25 form the basis of the op-
timization process which can be implemented by a va-
riety of well known algorithms. However, the numer-
ical examples presented in this paper are based on the
interior-point algorithm [55, 56] available in Matlab’s
linear programming toolbox.
So far, only unidirectional links have been consid-
ered. Without loss of generality, the equations proposed
remain valid for bidirectional links. Such links are nor-
mally represented by two reciprocal edges i.e., edges
connecting the same pair of nodes but allowing flow
in opposing directions. For instance, edges e12 and e21
are reciprocals. The outcome of the optimization some-
times results in flow across both reciprocal edges. How-
ever, since in practice both edges represent the same
physical link/element and given that flow at any instance
is possible in only one direction, the flows should be
normalised to obtain the actual flow through the link.
The actual direction of flow across the link is given by
the direction of the larger flow. The magnitude of this
flow is obtained by temporarily setting the capacity of
the edge with the smaller flow to zero and repeating the
optimization process. This is expressed in Equation 26
as;
Ωgh = 0 | (g, h) =
( j, i) If Xi j > X ji(i, j) Otherwise (26)
3.2.2. Output Calculation and Node Reconfiguration
In an engineering system, failure or change in output
level of one component may lead to change in output
level of other components. This change may trigger shut
down of operating components or restart of components
already in shut down. Therefore as components undergo
their normal failure and repair cycles, the system also
undergoes a series of shut down and restart operations.
It’s imperative that these shut down and restart opera-
tions be accounted for in the simulation process for a
realistic outcome as the failure of most components de-
pends on the time spent in operation.
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Taking a component out of operation affects all com-
ponents connected to it and hence process flow in the
system. Therefore, the effective output of a node after
every system transition is the flow through it when the
last shut down operation has been executed and there
are no nodes left requiring shut down. For this reason,
an iterative procedure is employed in system output cal-
culation. This procedure is based on the following as-
sumptions and principles,
• the availability of a node is determined by the mag-
nitude of its input flow only
• a node is shut down when the flow through it is ei-
ther zero or below its predefined threshold value
and its current capacity is non-zero; provided a
shut down state is defined in its state-space dia-
gram
• nodes are shut down in descending order of their
rank
• nodes with zero input flow are placed higher on the
scale.
• non-zero input flow nodes are ranked in order
of their degree of inadequacy (i.e percentage by
which the input falls short of the threshold)
• equally ranked nodes have the same priority and
are shut down randomly.
Highlighted below is the iterative procedure proposed
for system output calculation.
Step 1. Calculate system flow using equations 16, 19,
24 and 25.
Step 2. Find nodes requiring shut down and rank them.
Step 3. Select node at the top of the scale, save its next
transition parameters, execute shut down and
set its next transition time to infinity. If the in-
put of the node is non zero, add it to the set
U. Add the component to the maintenance list
if transition to a maintenance state from shut
down is possible and provided it’s not already
on the list and force maintenance.
Step 4. Repeat step 3 until all zero input nodes have
been shut down. Go to step 6 if there’s no node
left to shut down.
Step 5. Repeat steps 1 to 3 until the list of components
to shut down is exhausted.
Step 6. Determine state of sink nodes if necessary. This
is the state number corresponding to the magni-
tude of flow into the node.
The complementary restart operation is carried out to
restore nodes to their previous states prior to their being
shut down. Enumerated below are the steps entailed.
Step 1. Perform system flow optimization using equa-
tions 16, 19, 24 and 25, previous sink indices
and previous capacities of nodes before they
were shut down.
Step 2. Select a node in shut down.
Step 3. Check if its input flow exceeds its threshold
flow.
Step 4. If it does, determine how long it took in shut
down.
Step 5. Restore node to its previous state and update its
next failure time and state. Remove component
from maintenance list if it’s repairable only in
shut down. Also remove component from U if
applicable.
Next Failure Time = (Failure time before shut
down) + (time spent in shut down)
Step 6. Repeat steps 2 to 5 until all nodes in shut down
have been looped through. Go to step 8 if U is
empty.
Step 7. Set to zero the current capacities of components
in U and repeat steps 1 to 6.
Step 8. End procedure
3.3. Simulation Procedure
Summarised below are generic systematic steps pro-
posed for simulation of structurally static homogeneous
time dependent systems.
Step 1. Initialise system in preparation for simulation.
This involves the following,
a). initialization of vectors to save the current
capacities; {c{i}}M×1, current sink indices;
{ε{i}}M×1, next transition times;
τ | τ = {τi}M×1 as well as state and output
histories of nodes
b). setting the required number of simulations
(Nsamples), mission time (Tm)
Step 2. Set the simulation time; t = 0, U = ∅, sam-
ple the next transition parameters of nodes and
update τ.
Step 3. Determine initial state of sink nodes and carry
out any necessary reconfigurations (including
shut down and restart where necessary)
Step 4. Update initial state and output history of nodes
Step 5. Set the current simulation time to the minimum
of τ. That is, t = min(τ).
Step 6. Check for nodes with next transition time equal
to t i.e., τi = t and for each node, i,
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a). effect the required transition and sample its
next transition parameters
b). update τ, {c{i}}M×1, {ε{i}}M×1 and its state
history
c). add component to maintenance list if new
state is a maintenance state or if transition
to a maintenance state from new state is
possible.
Step 7. For each component on the maintenance list,
force maintenance.
Step 8. Compare previous and current values of
{c{i}}M×1 and {ε{i}}M×1. If a difference is ob-
served in at least one of the two vectors,
a). restart any nodes in shut down
b). determine the new value of matrix Φ
c). calculate system flow and shut down nodes
via the procedure described in section 3.2.2
using the new values of Φ, {c{i}}M×1 and
{ε{i}}M×1 . Note that all other parameters of
equations 16, 19, 24 and 25 remain static
throughout the simulation
d). for each node of the system, update output
history if new output is different from out-
put at previous transition.
Step 9. Repeat steps 5 to 8 until t = Tm, updating τ,
{c{i}}M×1 , {ε{i}}M×1 and node state & output his-
tories at every transition.
Step 10. Repeat steps 2 to 9 for the desired number of
times, saving node histories at each trial.
From the state and output histories of nodes, desired
reliability and performance indices can be obtained us-
ing standard statistical analyses and the basic definition
of the index of interest. These fall outside the scope of
this paper but details can be found in [57].
Indices such as failure distribution, failure frequency,
reliability function, average availability, instantaneous
availability, instantaneous output, state probabilities, ca-
pacity factor and actual distributions of transitions with
unknown distributions prior to the analysis are all ob-
tainable from the state and output histories of nodes.
State duration based simulation technique achieves
superior accuracy relative to the standard sequential
Monte Carlo simulation described in [41] when applied
to repairable systems. The upper hand is due to the in-
corporation of shut down and restart of nodes as a con-
sequence of the behaviour of other system nodes. The
standard technique on the other hand assumes statistical
independence of system nodes.
3.4. Limitations
The proposed simulation procedure is challenged by
two major limitations. The first is consequent of the
assumptions used for shut down and restart of nodes.
That is, the availability of a node is determined by the
magnitude of its input flow only. This restricts the ap-
plicability of the methodology to homogeneous and in-
dependent heterogeneous systems. However, it can be
easily extended to interdependent systems by incorpo-
rating fault trees and redefining the conditions for shut
down and restart.
Also, the capacity constraint imposed on source and
intermediate nodes means the effects of Common Cause
Failures (CCF) resulting from flow redistribution cannot
be studied. However, the procedure can be used in sys-
tem design to estimate the required system parameter
values to prevent these failures.
4. Case Studies
The principles and algorithms derived and described
in the preceding sections were translated into a Matlab
based application and applied to two case studies. The
random variable generator available in the open source
uncertainty quantification tool, OpenCossan [58]; de-
veloped at the Institute for Risk and Uncertainty of the
University of Liverpool was incorporated to enhance
sampling from any probability distribution including
user-defined distributions.
4.1. Case Study 1: A Simple Pipe Network
Figure 5: Structure of pipe network
Shown in Figure 5 is an oil transmission line showing
the state-space representation of each component and
was originally presented as Example 2.4 in [36]. Indi-
cated beside each arc is the transition rate (in transitions
per year) and beside each state number; the capacity (in
tons of oil flow) of the component in that state. Flow is
from left to right and the demand at Xout is conserva-
tively assumed to be at 3.5 tons since this is the maxi-
mum possible flow through the network.
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4.1.1. Analyses
The structure of the system can be represented by a
network of 5 nodes. Numbering these chronologically
from left to right, the network model is as given in Fig-
ure 6.
Figure 6: Network model of pipe network
Given that the efficiency and capacity of the links are
of no interest in the analysis, the links are assumed to be
100% efficient and the adjacency matrix becomes;
A =

0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0

From A, e and Γ can be obtained using Algorithm 2 as;
e =

1 2
1 3
2 4
3 4
4 5
 Γ =

1 1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 1
0 0 0 0 −1

Applying the procedures described in Section 3.2.1, the
parameters of the flow equations are obtained as;
Θ =

1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
 ub =

1.5
2
1.5
2
3.5

Φ =
 −1 0 1 0 00 −1 0 1 00 0 −1 −1 1

The objective function, Ψ is;
Ψ =
(
−1 −1 0 0 0
)

X12
X13
X24
X34
X45

(a) Nodes 2 & 3 in all
3 cases
(b) Node 4 in Case 2
(c) Node 4 in Case 3
Figure 7: State-space diagram of components
Note: CM represents corrective maintenance state.
The problem under review was solved by Lisnianski et
al.[36] using Markov Chain and assuming on-line re-
pairs to node 4. This was repeated using the technique
described in this paper and the analysis taken further by
considering two other possible operating principles that
can be imposed on the system. These are summarised
as,
1. Assuming on-line repairs to node 4.
2. Node 4 is taken out of operation during repairs and
these repairs commence almost instantaneously as
the node enters a degraded state.
3. Node 4 is taken out of operation during repairs but
a repair action only commences after the compo-
nent is shut down as a result of failure of other
nodes.
The system was analysed for these 3 cases and the re-
sults compared to bring out the effects of the various
assumptions on the reliability and performance indices
of the system. Figure 7 shows the state-space diagrams
of all 3 components modelled as described in Section
2.1.
4.1.2. Results and Comments
For a mission time of 4 years and 20000 samples, the
reliability and performance indices of the system ob-
tained from the simulation are presented in Figure 8.
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(a) Reliability function
(b) Instantaneous Output
Figure 8: System reliability and performance indices
Though this case study involves a simple system, it
presents an irrefutable illustration of the effects of com-
ponent modelling error on accurate estimation of system
reliability and performance indices. As shown in Figure
8, modelling node 4 according to the assumptions made
in case 1 would result in over estimation of system reli-
ability and output if the system were operated according
to case 2 or 3.
4.2. Case Study 2: A Multi-State Bridge Network
Bridge networks are a typical example of structural
complexity exhibited by engineering systems. Reliabil-
ity analysis of even the simplest bridge network is cum-
bersome when compared to analysis of a similarly sized
system with a non-bridge configuration.
To show the applicability of the methodology devel-
oped, the imaginary multi-output, non-repairable com-
plex bridge network shown in Figure 9 is considered. In
the network, nodes 1, 2 and 3 respectively designated
S 1, S 2 and S 3 are sources while nodes 4, 5 and 6 are
sinks respectively labelled Xout1, Xout2 and Xout3. The
source nodes have identical failure characteristics but
the capacity of S 1 is 1.5 times the individual capacities
of the other sources. Also, the demand at node 6(70
units) is twice the individual demands at nodes 4 and 5.
In addition, all diagonal links in the network are unidi-
rectional with flow from left to right.
1
2
34
5
67
8 9 10
11 12 13
14 15 16
17 18
19 20
21
Figure 9: Block diagram of test bridge network
Figure 10: State space diagram of nodes (a)Source nodes
(b)Intermediate nodes(c) Nodes 14-20 for case 3
4.2.1. Analyses
The intermediate nodes, according to their position
in the system and similarity in failure characteristics are
grouped and arbitrarily designated as follows,
a). nodes 7 to 13 and node 21 will be referred to as
central nodes
b). nodes 14 to 16, referred to as vertical bridge nodes
and
c). nodes 17 to 20, referred to as horizontal bridge
nodes
Shown in Figure 10 are the state space diagrams of the
nodes of the system as modelled by the procedure de-
scribed in Section 2.1. W, PF, F and S respectively rep-
resent Working; depicting the operation of a node at its
expected level, partial failure; when the node operates
below its expected level, Failure; when the node is com-
pletely failed and Shut down; when the node is taken out
of operation but not as result of failure. The network
was analysed for three cases;
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1. when flow through components 17 to 20 is from
left to right only but components 14 to 16 are bidi-
rectional
2. when components 14 to 20 are bidirectional
3. when components 14 to 20 are bidirectional and
have a failure state in which their capacity remains
unchanged but efficiency reduces by 20%.
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Figure 11: System network model for case 1
The properties and failure characteristics of the com-
ponents of the system are presented in Table 1.
Exp(a) represents an exponential distribution of mean
a, LN(a, b); a Log-Normal distribution of mean a and
standard deviation b and W(a, b); a Weibull distribution
with parameters a and b. It should be noted that the
same component failure characteristics are used in all
three cases.
Table 1: Node properties
Node Type Transition Distribution Capacity
1-2 Exp(10)
S 1 1-3 LN(20,2)
(
60 45 0 0
)
2-3 LN(4.5,1.2)
Central Nodes 1-2 LN(15,3)
(
70 0 0
)
Bridge Nodes 1-2 W(12,2)
(
35 0 0
)
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Figure 12: System network model for cases 2 & 3
Each output node is modelled as a three-state object
depending on the level of load flow realised at its in-
put. These are, Working; assumed when the flow is at
its maximum expected level, partial failure; when the
flow is greater than zero but less than the required max-
imum and failure; assumed when no load flows into the
node. Shown in Figures 11 and 12 are the network mod-
els of the system for all three scenarios under consider-
ation with an indication of the maximum allowable load
through each edge.
4.2.2. Results and Comments
The system was simulated for a mission time of 20
hours using 60,000 samples. Presented in Table 2 is a
summary of the average values of the most important
reliability indices for Xout1 and shown in Figure 15 are
its failure time distributions.
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(a) Xout1
(b) Xout2
(c) Xout3
Figure 13: System reliability functions
Table 2: Reliability indices for Xout1
Indices Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
0.1072 0.10737 0.10695
State Probability 0.40398 0.46826 0.52755
0.4887 0.42437 0.3655
Capacity Factor 0.4345 0.44333 0.40592
Availability 0.5113 0.57563 0.6345
MTTF 10.2306 11.5172 12.6959
No. of Failures 0.9996 0.9996 0.9995
The expected instantaneous output and reliability
functions at the three output nodes are respectively pre-
sented in Figures 14 and 13. This case study was
(a) Xout1
(b) Xout2
(c) Xout3
Figure 14: Expected instantaneous system output
Figure 15: Failure time distribution for Xout1
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designed to portray the effects of system configura-
tion and efficiency of components on the reliability and
performance of output nodes. As evidenced in Figures
14 and 13, the performance and reliability of the system
at output nodes except Xout3 are indeed affected by the
factors under consideration.
System reliability in this case study is defined with
respect to complete failure i.e., zero output. Therefore a
non-zero load flow at a node renders it reliable irrespec-
tive of the magnitude of flow. The reliability of Xout3
remains unaffected in all three cases (see Figure 13c)
because being a terminal node, the magnitude of flow
realised at its inlet may change from case to case but
the likelihood of the presence of this flow remains unaf-
fected. The case study indicates why reliability should
not be used as the only parameter to compare the re-
sponse of a multi-state system under different condi-
tions. It also shows that the response of an output node
depends on its position in the system relative to other
output nodes as well as sources.
4.3. Computational Costs
Flow Calculation 80%
Update Output 6%
Sampling 3%
Reconfiguration 5%
Others 6%
(a) Case Study 1
Flow Calculation 89%
Update Output 6%
Sampling 3%Others 3%
(b) Case Study 2
Figure 16: Simulation time utilisation per subroutine
Table 3: Actual computational cost per case study
Case Studies
1 2
Average time per sample (s) 3.92 0.9287
Estimated total time (s) 78400 55722
Actual simulation time (s) 3163 2128.267
Improvement factor 24.79 26.18
Figure 16 shows how the total simulation time is dis-
tributed among the key tasks of the algorithm. They are
based on a study of 1000 samples each, of the two case
studies on a 48 core, 1895.257MHz AMD Opteron(tm)
6168 processor. In Table 3 is a comparison of what
the simulation times would be if run serially on a single
core and the actual times spent using 24 cores running
in parallel. We used 24 cores because the simulations
were run on a shared facility and that was the maxi-
mum allowed for a single user. The estimated time is the
product of the simulation time per sample and the total
number of samples (20000 and 60000 for cases 1 and 2
respectively). Ideally, the improvement factor; the ratio
of estimated to actual simulation time should be slightly
less than the number of parallel cores due to initializa-
tion and overhead communication among cores. How-
ever, during parallelization, certain system initialization
steps which were repeated for every sample in the se-
rial simulation were carried out only once and broadcast
across all 24 cores resulting in time gains.
Flow calculation, as depicted by Figure 16 accounts
for the largest share of the computation time. Its magni-
tude depends on the nature and size of the system (i.e.,
whether the system is repairable or not), mission time
and total number of simulation samples. There were on
average 142 calls to the flow calculation subroutine per
simulation sample in case study 1 with each call last-
ing 0.0221 seconds. Case study 2 had an average of
20 calls per simulation sample, each call lasting 0.0430
seconds. Incorporating variance reduction techniques
resulting in less number of samples required should im-
prove the time efficiency. Depending on the system,
additional gains can also be derived from the complete
omission of the reconfiguration subroutine. Reconfigu-
ration (shut down & restart of nodes) is unnecessary for
non-repairable systems (e.g. case study 2) and systems
for which components are assumed to be statistically in-
dependent.
In summary, the size and degree of system activity
determine the simulation time. However, as evidenced
in Table 3, the 21-node non-repairable system with less
activity required less simulation time than the 5-node
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repairable system even though 3 times more simulation
samples were used for the former. Therefore, the degree
of system activity takes precedence over size in deter-
mining the simulation time.
5. Conclusions
Complex systems occur in various Engineering appli-
cations. However, their reliability analysis is normally
impaired by their complexity and imposed operational
loops. In the presence of these, a credible estimate of
the associated reliability and performance indices is re-
quired. However, the assumptions applied to the system
and component modelling process may negatively im-
pact the integrity of the outcome obtained.
In this paper, a novel and generally applicable sim-
ulation approach to reliability and performance evalua-
tion of complex multi-state systems with multiple out-
puts has been presented. The approach allows simu-
lation of repairable and non-repairable complex multi-
state systems of any topology without prior knowledge
of system path and cut-sets. Owing to its flexibility, it
can be easily extended to model cold and warm standby
redundant systems, investigate cascading failure mod-
els and model systems with maintenance delays. The
two numerical case studies presented have shown its ef-
fectiveness in analysing multi-state systems without the
need to enumerate system performance levels or make
unrealistic assumptions thereby rendering the process
simple and robust to errors. The methodology enhances
easy incorporation of system dynamics like flow losses,
loading restrictions and promptness of maintenance ac-
tions in the reliability evaluation process as illustrated
in the case studies.
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